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ABSTRACT
HTTP Attack Detection using N-gram Analysis
by Adityaram Oza
Previous research has shown that byte level analysis of HTTP traffic offers a
practical solution to the problem of network intrusion detection and traffic analysis.
Such an approach does not require any knowledge of applications running on web
servers or any pre-processing of incoming data. In this project, we apply three n-
gram based techniques to the problem of HTTP attack detection. The goal of such
techniques is to provide a first line of defense by filtering out the vast majority of
benign HTTP traffic. We analyze our techniques in terms of accuracy of attack
detection and performance. We show that our techniques provide more accurate
detecting and are more efficient in comparison to a previously analyzed HMM-based
technique.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Security of large-scale web applications is an important topic in information se-
curity. According to [21], approximately 4500 new web based attacks were introduced
each day in 2011. According to [4], web application servers are common targets for
malware attacks, in part because they communicate with many other systems and
therefore help to spread malware.
Open source examples of network intrusion detection systems include [5] and [19].
Previous research has shown that raw bytes of network traffic on the wire can be
directly used for intrusion detection and traffic analysis [2, 15, 25]. Such an approach
does not require any knowledge of applications running on the web servers or any
pre-processing of incoming data.
Most of HTTP traffic for online shopping malls, government websites consists
of only text data, i.e., ASCII printable characters. In particular, we do not expect
any executable code in incoming HTTP packets. Such executable code can be a
possible malware injection attack [1]. Therefore, analysis of the distributions of bytes
in HTTP packets can convey useful information about expected HTTP traffic and
can help us to detect attacks.
Techniques based on hidden Markov models and n-gram analysis have been used
to successfully detect HTTP attacks [2, 15, 25]. In [25] an n-gram model is applied
to raw bytes in HTTP packets. The paper [2] considers the use of hidden Markov
models to analyze the structure of HTTP packets. The n-gram based technique
in [25] has been applied to the problem of file-type classification in [1], where byte
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distributions are used to classify files as executable, text, or multimedia. The paper [1]
also proposes a pattern counting technique to classify text and executable files. The
paper [22] proposes a technique based on a χ2 statistic and HMMs to detect malware.
In this paper, we employ n-gram analysis similar to that in [1, 25]. We also
consider a χ2 test similar to that in [22]. In both cases, we apply the technique to the
problem of HTTP attack detection. We also employ the pattern counting technique
similar to that in [1]. Our goal is to provide a first line of defense by filtering out
the vast majority of innocent HTTP traffic. Then potentially malicious traffic can
be further analyzed with other sophisticated (and more costly) intrusion detection
techniques.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we give an overview of
network intrusion detection and discuss few examples of byte-level analysis techniques
applied to web traffic. We also discuss Pearson’s χ2 distance, which is the basis of one
of our attack detection techniques. In Chapter 3, we cover the design of our detection
techniques. Chapter 4 gives details about the datasets we use in our experiments to
represent benign HTTP traffic and attack traffic. In Chapter 5 and 6, we present our
results and evaluate the performance of our proposed techniques. In Chapter 7, we
conclude the paper and discuss future work.
2
CHAPTER 2
Background
Development of methods for anomaly based intrusion detection is an important
research problem in computer and network security. In this chapter, we discuss
network intrusion detection systems and review some detection strategies applied to
this problem. We also discuss the concept of Pearson’s χ2 statistic in general.
2.1 Network intrusion detection systems
A network intrusion detection system examines network traffic in real time and
raises alarms when some potentially malicious traffic is detected [18]. Many existing
intrusion detection systems are signature based [5, 19].While such systems are able
to detect known attacks effectively, they cannot prevent ’zero day’ attacks or variants
of known attacks.
An anomaly based detection strategy is capable of detecting unknown attacks.
But such a technique is complex and,is more costly and tends to raise lot of false
alarms. Designing an anomaly based detection strategy which is accurate and effi-
cient, poses a significant challenge to security researchers.
2.2 Previous research
In this section, we discuss some intrusion detection techniques that employ byte
level analysis of web traffic.
3
2.2.1 HMM-based detection
The paper [2] proposes a technique to model the structure of benign HTTP
traffic using hidden Markov models [16]. Hidden Markov models or HMMs first
appeared in [16] and were applied to problems in speech recognition. The training
algorithm of an HMM models the structure of training data using a discrete hill climb
approach [20]. The testing algorithm calculates probability of an input sequence with
respect to the model to determine how well it fits the model [20].
The technique in [2] comprises of two phases—Training phase and Testing phase.
In the training phase, n-gram sequences of bytes are extracted from benign HTTP
traffic packets and are used to train a hidden Markov model. Some features of the
training phase are mentioned below.
1. Multiple Classifiers - The authors propose the use of multiple HMMs instead of
a single HMM to construct a more accurate model of benign HTTP payloads.
Each HMM in the model has a different initial value for A, B and pi matrices.
Each HMM is trained on byte sequences extracted from the same training set of
benign HTTP traffic. The training phase of a hidden Markov model is a discrete
hill climb which stops at the local maxima. The authors claim to mitigate this
problem with the use of multiple HMMs with different starting points, where
some HMMs converge better than others. A final score for classifying an input
sequence during testing phase, is a combination of scores given to the sequence
by each HMM [2].
2. Number of hidden states - The number of hidden states of an HMM is equal
to the size of n-grams used to train the model [2]. For example, if we want to
score 5 grams of byte sequences, then the HMM should have 5 states.
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The trained HMMs are expected to give a higher probability score to packets of
benign HTTP traffic when compared to packets of attack traffic.
In the detection phase, an incoming HTTP packet is scored against trained
HMMs. The packet is classified as benign or malicious based on the probability
score computed by the HMMs. Figure 1 shows the detection phase of this technique.
Figure 1: HMMPayl IDS Architecture
N -gram sequences of bytes are extracted from payloads and each sequence is
scored against an HMM. If the length of the payload is L bytes, then a total of
K = L− n+ 1 n-gram sequences can be extracted from it.
Figure 2 explains extraction of 5 grams from a packet of size 10 bytes. Six
sequences of 5 grams are extracted from the packet and each sequence is scored
against the HMM.
The probability score of the packet by the HMM is obtained by computing an
arithmetic mean of scores of each n-gram sequence.
P (O|λ) = 1
K
K∑
j=1
P (Oj|λ) (1)
5
Figure 2: HMMPayl feature extraction scheme
In (1), O is the sequence of bytes extracted from a packet, K is the total number
of n-gram sequences extracted from O and λ is a trained HMM.
The sequence O is scored against other HMMs using the same method described
above. In Figure 3, xi is the test packet, si,1...k are scores of packet xi computed
by each of HMMs—HMM1–HMMk. The probability scores calculated by the HMMs
are combined by computing an arithmetic mean , geometric mean , maximum or
minimum of the scores. si
∗ is the final score of packet xi computed by K HMMs in
the model.
Figure 3: Packet scored against multiple HMMs
The final score of the packet is used to classify the packet as benign or malicious.
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2.2.2 N-gram based detection
The paper [25] discusses an approach based on n-gram analysis of bytes in web
traffic to detect attacks. They construct protocol specific models of benign traffic
by analyzing frequency distributions of 1 gram of bytes from traffic captured on the
following 6 ports: 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 80.
All incoming traffic packets on a port are compared to the model of benign traffic
for that port. A Mahalanobis distance [13] is calculated between frequency vector of
incoming packet and mean of the model.
The authors of [25] present an improved version in [24] where they consider the
use of site specific traffic to construct a model for benign traffic.
The paper [1] applies the n-gram based approach in [25] to the problem of file
type classification where byte distributions of files are analyzed to classify an unknown
file as a text, multimedia or an executable file. A model for executable files is built by
extracting n-grams of bytes from training set of executable files. Mean and standard
deviation are calculated for all unique n-grams of bytes that appear in the training
set.
During the testing phase, an unknown file is processed to calculate relative fre-
quency vector of n-grams of bytes. The relative frequency vector is compared to the
model by computing its distance from mean vector of executable file model by using
simplified Mahalanobis distance measure.
d(X, Y ) =
N∑
i=1
|Xi − Yi|
δi
(2)
In (2), X is the frequency vector of the unknown file, Y is the mean vector, δ is
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the standard deviation vector and N is the total number of n-grams.
As shown in Figure 4, if the Mahalanobis distance is larger than a certain thresh-
old α, the file is classified as a multimedia file.
Figure 4: File type classification scheme
If the distance is smaller than α, then the file can be an executable file or a text
file.
The authors propose another technique to separate text files and executable
files. In this technique, a list of n-grams that appear in executable files is constructed
from training set of executable files. The unknown file is processed to calculate the
number of n-grams present in the list. The count is normalized by the file size. If the
normalized count is greater than a threshold β, then the file classified as an executable
file, else it is classified as a text file.
Such a technique works well because executable files have very large number of
unique n-gram sequences compared to text files.
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2.2.3 Other related work
The paper [15] considers the use of 2v gram analysis to detect attacks in HTTP
traffic. A 2v gram is a group of 2 bytes which are v bytes apart in an HTTP packet.
For a given distance of v, byte distributions of 2v grams are used to train a one class
SVM. If there are M different values of v, then M one class SVM models are trained
on byte sequences from benign HTTP traffic.
In the detection phase, an unknown packet is processed and byte distributions are
compared to M one class SVMs in the model. The final score given to the unknown
packet is a combination of scores computed by each of the M one class SVMs.
The paper [12] discusses a χ2 statistic based technique to detect malformed or
malicious DNS traffic. They construct a model of benign DNS traffic by analyzing
the type of DNS request, length of the request and byte distributions of the request.
The byte distributions are analyzed using a χ2 statistic test.
An incoming packet is processed to determine type of the request and length
of the request. The byte distribution of the packet is compared to expected byte
distribution for benign DNS traffic using a χ2 test. A combined score based on
request type, length and χ2 test is computed for the unknown packet. This score is
used to classify the packet as benign or malicious.
2.3 Pearson’s χ2 test
In this section, we review Pearson’s χ2 statistic which has been applied to the
problem of HTTP attack detection in this paper.
Pearson’s χ2 test is a hypothesis test to determine closeness between 2 frequency
distributions. The goal of such a test is to confirm whether an observed distribution
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fits some expected distribution [6].
In hypothesis testing, one or more hypotheses are proposed initially. The initial
hypothesis is referred to as null hypothesis and is denoted by H0. The alternative
hypothesis is denoted by H1. The null hypothesis is assumed to be true at the
beginning of the statistical test.
The result of the statistical test indicates whether the assumptions regarding
the observed distribution are true or not. The hypotheses are accepted or rejected
depending on the result of the statistical test. There are 2 types of errors associated
with hypothesis testing
1. Type I error or False positive - An error of this type occurs when null hypothesis
H0 is falsely rejected when it should have been accepted. Type I error rate is
denoted by α.
2. Type II error or False negative - An error of this type occurs when null hy-
pothesis H0 is falsely accepted when the alternative hypothesis H1 should have
been accepted. Type II error rate is denoted by β.
In this paper, we use a χ2 statistic as an estimator function to determine dif-
ference between expected and observed distributions of n-grams of byte sequences in
HTTP packets.
2.3.1 χ2 Statistic
A χ2 statistic between an observed distribution and an expected distribution is
calculated as -
10
D2(O,E) =
N∑
i=1
(Oi − Ei)2
Ei
(3)
In (3), D2(O,E) is a χ2 distance between an observed distribution O and an
expected distribution E and N -1 is the degrees of freedom for the χ2 test.
We apply the χ2 statistic test on n-grams of byte sequences of HTTP packets.
So,the number of degrees of freedom is equal to (256n − 1) for an n-gram size. In
the detection phase, we classify an unknown packet as a benign packet or a malicious
packet. A χ2 distance is computed between observed n-gram distribution of the
unknown packet and frequency distribution of benign HTTP packets.
The computed distance D2 and degrees of freedom N -1 can be used to obtain
a p-value from the χ2 table. The p-value indicates the probability of the observed
distribution to fit with the expected distribution. A large distance score indicates a
lower p-value and a small distance score indicates a large p-value. Hence the distance
scores themselves can be used directly instead of calculating p-value using a χ2 table.
The computed distance D2 is compared against a threshold—χ2(α,N − 1).
χ2(α,N − 1) is a decision threshold for a χ2 distribution with N − 1 degrees of
freedom and a maximum type I error rate of α.
The null hypothesis H0 and the alternative hypothesis H1 are set up as
H0 : D
2 > χ2(α,N − 1)
H1 : D
2 <= χ2(α,N − 1)
The unknown packet is assumed to be a malicious packet according to the null
hypothesis H0. Let us assume that maximum false positive rate allowed by our
technique is 0.05 ie No more than 5% of attack packets can be classified as benign
11
packets.
If D2 score is greater than threshold χ2(0.05, N − 1), then the null hypothesis
is retained and the packet is classified as malicious. If the score is less than the
threshold, then the null hypothesis is rejected and the packet is classified as benign.
12
CHAPTER 3
Design Overview
The goal of our project is to design and implement an accurate and efficient
technique for detecting attacks in HTTP traffic. Our approach is based on byte level
analysis of HTTP packets captured on the wire.
In the proposed solution, we build a model for benign HTTP traffic by analyzing
frequencies of n-grams of bytes that appear in HTTP packets. In the detection phase,
an incoming HTTP packet is compared to the model by computing a χ2 statistic. The
packet is classified as benign or malicious based on the χ2 distance score. We also
consider an adhoc n-gram distance measure and pattern counting described in [17]
and [1], respectively, as alternative approaches to detect HTTP attacks.
3.1 χ2 distance
In this technique, we compute a χ2 statistic between observed n-gram frequency
distribution of an unknown packet and expected frequency distribution of benign
traffic. This approach comprises of 2 phases—Training phase and Testing phase. In
the training phase, a model, representative of benign HTTP traffic, is constructed
using frequency counts of n grams of bytes from benign HTTP packets.
1. Each HTTP packet in the training set is processed to obtain frequency counts
of all unique n-grams of bytes.
2. The frequency count of each n-gram is normalized by the size of the packet to
obtain a relative frequency count.
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3. A frequency vector, using relative frequency counts of n-grams, is constructed
for every packet.
4. A mean vector for the model is constructed by computing the arithmetic mean
of relative frequencies for each n-gram across all packets in the training set.
The mean vector indicates the expected frequency distribution of bytes in a
benign HTTP packet. Figure 5 shows the training and detection phase of χ2 distance
technique.
In the detection phase, an incoming packet is compared to the model of benign
traffic to determine how much similar it is to benign HTTP traffic packets.
1. The incoming packet is processed to compute frequency of all n-grams of bytes
in the packet.
2. The frequency count for an n-gram is normalized with the size of the packet to
obtain a relative frequency count.
3. A frequency vector is constructed using relative frequency counts of all n-grams.
4. A χ2 statistic is computed between frequency vector of the packet and the mean
vector computed during the training phase.
D2(X, Y ) =
N∑
i=1
(Xi − Yi)2
Yi
(4)
In (4), X is the frequency vector of the incoming packet, Y is the mean vector
representative of benign traffic and N is the total number of n-grams being
considered. If we consider 3 grams , then N = (256)3 . The degrees of freedom
for χ2 statistic is N − 1.
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Figure 5: χ2 Distance
If an n-gram appears in the incoming packet but does not appear in any of the
packets in the training set, the Yi component for that n-gram is 0 in (4). In
this case, the denominator is smoothed by considering minimum value for an
n-gram from the mean vector Y .
5. If the χ2 distance score is lesser than a threshold α, then the packet is classified
as a benign HTTP packet , else it is classified as a potentially malicious packet.
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The χ2 distance score of the packet determines the likelihood of the packet being
a benign HTTP packet. Malicious packets are expected to have a larger distance from
mean of distribution compared to benign HTTP packets.
The algorithm only needs to keep track of n-grams of bytes, which appear during
training or testing phase.
3.2 Ad-hoc n-gram distance
This is an alternative distance measure we have used in this project. The distance
between frequency vector and mean vector is calculated using (5).
d(X, Y ) =
(
N∑
i=1
|Xi − Yi|
)2
(5)
The training phase and testing phase of this approach are similar to the χ2 distance
based technique explained above.
3.3 Pattern Counting
This is an alternative technique we apply on the problem of HTTP attack detec-
tion. In this technique, we count the number of unique n-grams of bytes that appear
in benign HTTP traffic . This approach is based on a technique to classify executable
files and text files in [1].
1. Each packet in training set is processed to obtain unique n-grams of bytes.
2. In the end, we have a list of n-grams that appear in our training set of HTTP
packets.
3. In the testing phase, we count occurrences of n-grams of bytes from an incoming
packet which are present in the list of n-grams from training data.
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4. The count of n-grams obtained in the previous step is normalized by packet size
to obtain a relative count.
5. If the relative count is above a certain threshold value, then the packet is clas-
sified as a benign HTTP packet, else it is classified as a malicious packet.
Figure 6 shows training and detection phases of pattern counting technique.
HTTP packets which are similar to those in training data are expected to have a
higher relative count compared to other packets. A big advantage of such an approach
is that it is extremely fast and simple compared to other n-gram based approaches,
machine learning based techniques and other statistical techniques applied to the
problem of intrusion detection.
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Figure 6: Pattern Counting
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CHAPTER 4
Datasets
We have used multiple datasets of benign HTTP traffic and attack traffic for the
purposes of testing our techniques. In this chapter, we give details of the datasets
and explain methods we have used to simulate realistic HTTP traffic.
4.1 Publicly available Datasets
In this section, we describe publicly available datasets of benign traffic and attack
traffic which we have used for our experiments. Researchers often make their datasets
publicly available for other researchers, students and scientific community to facilitate
new research.
4.1.1 Benign Traffic
The authors of [2] provided us a dataset [8] of simulated HTTP traffic. The
DARPA’99 [8] dataset consists of 5 days of benign HTTP traffic to and from an
airforce base. The experiments of MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory produced 3 weeks of
network traffic. The aim of these experiments was to produce labeled datasets for
network intrusion detection. The authors of paper [2] use HTTP traffic from the first
week of DARPA dataset to evaluate their intrusion detection technique. We chose
this dataset to construct models for benign HTTP traffic for our experiments. Table 1
gives details about the dataset.
19
Table 1: DARPA Dataset
Day Number of TCP Packets Number of Data Packets
1 161,602 28,187
2 196,605 34,446
3 189,362 33,051
4 268,250 44,185
5 150,847 26,315
4.1.2 Attack Traffic
We have used 3 datasets of HTTP attack traffic for our experiments. As with
DARPA dataset, these datasets were used by the authors of paper [2].
4.1.2.1 Generic Attacks Dataset
This is a publicly available dataset of HTTP attacks provided by the authors of
the paper [10].It consists of 66 attacks which includes Denial of service attacks, URL
decoding error attacks , shell code attacks and other attacks that cause information
leakage. According to [2], the traffic in these datasets resembles benign HTTP traffic
and hence these attacks are difficult to detect using statistical techniques.
4.1.2.2 Shellcode attacks Dataset
This dataset consists of 11 shellcode attacks. A shellcode attack tries to inject
malware by exploiting a buffer overflow vulnerability on the target machine. These
attacks are easier to detect as they contain byte sequences which are not present in
most of benign HTTP packets. Benign traffic consists of ASCII printable characters
and does not contain any executable bytes in the packets.
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4.1.2.3 CLET attacks Dataset
CLET is a polymorphic worm generator which creates multiple encrypted ver-
sions of malware [7]. According to [2], CLET engine was used to create multiple
versions of 8 shellcode attacks from Shellcode Attacks dataset.
Table 2 gives details about the attack datasets mentioned above.
Table 2: Attack Datasets
Name Number of Attacks Number of Data Packets
Generic Attacks 66 205
Shellcode Attacks 11 93
CLET Dataset 96 792
4.2 Simulated traffic datasets
We simulated large datasets of benign HTTP traffic and attack traffic for our
experiments. We chose to simulate HTTP traffic rather than use real captured traffic
to be sure there is no noise in the data used for our experiments.
4.2.1 Benign traffic
We simulated a dataset of benign HTTP traffic by setting up a wordpress [26]
website. We created bots to generate HTTP requests towards the website and cap-
tured packets with tcpdump [23]. The traffic requests were generated using valid
user-agents, valid HTTP methods and HTTP header parameters to make the simu-
lated traffic as realistic as possible. Table 3 gives details about this dataset.
21
Table 3: Simulated Benign Traffic
Number of Packets
42,128
4.2.2 Attack Traffic
We simulated large datasets for 9 attacks to test our techniques. The challenge
was to generate multiple versions of attacks that were realistic when compared to real
attack traffic.
All attack traffic was generated using Metasploit [14]. Metasploit is a penetration
testing framework which allows users to locate vulnerabilities in target systems and
create bots to automate attacks. We used several in built modules of Metasploit to
generate multiple versions of the same attack.
As our dataset of benign traffic was based on a wordpress [26] website, we felt
that generating attacks related to php based vulnerabilities will be relevant for this
project. We chose 9 attacks—4 php based attacks, 2 twiki based attacks, 3 shell code
attacks—and created 100 versions for each attack. We divided the 9 attacks into
three datasets. Here we give more details about each attack dataset and describe
the techniques we used to make the traffic look as realistic as possible. Table 4 gives
details about attack traffic datasets.
4.2.2.1 Php based Attacks Dataset
This dataset consists of 4 php based attacks. Wordpress is a php based technol-
ogy. Attacks in this dataset are most relevant to corresponding dataset of simulated
benign HTTP traffic.
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1. WordPress plugin Foxypress Arbitrary Code Execution—A vulnerability in the
foxypress plugin of wordpress software allows an attacker to upload a php script
file on the server and execute code.
2. WordPress cache lastpostdate Arbitrary Code Execution—This vulnerability
in wordpress software works when PHP ’register globals’ option is enabled and
allows an attacker to inject php code through a cookie parameter in an HTTP
request.
3. PHP XML-RPC Arbitrary Code Execution—A flaw in the XML RPC module
can be exploited by the attacker to embed OS commands in an xml file.
4. PHP Apache Request Headers Buffer Overflow—This vulnerability in PHP CGI
allows an attacker to exploit a stack based buffer overflow from a parameter in
the header of an HTTP request.
4.2.2.2 Twiki based Attacks
This dataset consists of 2 twiki based attacks.
1. Twiki search function arbitrary command execution—The search component
of Twiki can be exploited to execute OS commands by passing them to the
’WebSearch’ script.
2. Twiki History TwikiUsers Parameter Command Execution—The search com-
ponent in Twiki can be used to inject commands by passing them to the ’Twik-
iUsers’ script.
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4.2.2.3 Microsoft based buffer overflow attacks
This dataset consists of 3 attacks which attempt to exploit buffer overflow vul-
nerabilities on Microsoft IIS server.
1. Microsoft IIS MDAC msadcs.dll buffer overflow—This vulnerability can be used
to execute code when msadcs.dll and RDS factory service are exposed on IIS
servers.
2. Microsoft IIS 5.0 IDQ buffer overflow -This vulnerability allows an attacker to
exploit a stack based buffer overflow in IDQ ISAPI handler for Microsoft Index
Server.
3. Microsoft IIS 5.0 Printer Host Header Overflow—This vulnerability exploits a
buffer overflow in the request processor of the Internet Printing Protocol ISAPI
module in IIS.
Table 4: Simulated Attack Traffic
Number
of packets
Attack per attack
Php apache request headers buffer overflow 2
Wordpress Foxypress code execution 1,2
Wordpress lastpostdate code execution 2,3
Php XML-RPC code execution 1
Twiki Search function code execution 1
Twiki History function code execution 1
IIS MDAC msadcs.dll buffer overflow 1
IIS IDQ buffer overflow 3
IIS Printer Host buffer overflow 1
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Figure 7 shows a benign HTTP request and the Figure 8 shows a request of a
PHP Wordpress foxypress attack. We have constructed the HTTP header—Request
URI , Host and User-Agent—in a way to make an attack resemble a benign HTTP
request as much as possible.
Figure 7: Benign HTTP Request
Metasploit provides in built modules to generate multiple variants of an attack.
Some of the techniques we used to create variants of an attack are given below.
1. A different version of shell code is generated by metasploit for each attack
attempt.
2. We limit the maximum size of TCP data segments for some attacks. For ex-
ample, if the maximum tcp segment size is 400 bytes, then an attack of length
1100 bytes is divided across 3 packets of length 400 bytes , 400 bytes and 300
bytes. If there is no limit imposed on maximum tcp segment size, then the
entire attack payload can be transmitted in 1 TCP packet.
3. We insert random bytes at the end of a URI of an attack request.
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Figure 8: Sample Attack Request
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CHAPTER 5
Experiments
We apply our techniques on datasets of benign HTTP traffic and attack traffic.
Our aim is to filter out majority of benign HTTP traffic with simple and efficient
techniques.
In [2], hidden Markov models were used to construct a model for benign HTTP
traffic. The reported results indicate that their technique is slow and may not offer a
practical solution to the problem. We perform experiments similar to the ones in [2]
and evaluate our techniques on the basis of accuracy of detection and performance.
We offer a direct comparison with results in [2] and show that our techniques give
better results with substantial improvement in performance in terms of processing
time.
5.1 Experimental Setup
The DARPA’99 dataset [8] was used to obtain packets of benign HTTP traffic.
Raw bytes of HTTP traffic were extracted from TCP packets from tcpdump [23]
packet capture (pcap) files.
A five fold cross validation, similar to the one in [2], was used to train the model
for each technique. A five fold cross validation is used to obtain 5 times more results
with limited amount of data available [11]. One day of traffic from DARPA dataset
was used for training and traffic from remaining days was used for testing purposes.
The experiment was repeated for each of the 5 days of traffic.
As cited in the previous chapter, datasets of attack traffic include Generic Attacks
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dataset, Shellcode Attacks dataset and CLET dataset. These datasets are similar to
the ones used in [2]. Each packet from the attack datasets was tested against a model
of benign traffic constructed using the DARPA dataset.
We experimented with n-gram sizes 1–5. We observed that increasing the order
of n-grams more than 5 did not give any substantial benefit in accuracy of detection
and lead to increased processing times.
5.2 Performance Evaluation
The scores for benign traffic and attack traffic are plotted on a single graph for
each attack dataset and n-gram size. The thresholds are varied based on the scores
and number true positives and false positives are calculated for each threshold.
A true positive occurs when a benign packet is classified as benign packet by
the technique. A false positive occurs when an attack packet is classified as a benign
packet.For all our experiments, we compute a score for each packet and calculate a
per packet detection rate.
True positive rate is plotted against false positive rate for each threshold. This
graph is known as Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve [9]. ROC curves
were used by electrical engineers in applications related to signal detection theory. An
ROC curve measures the performance of a binary classifier by varying the threshold
parameter.
The effectiveness of the test is determined by measuring area of the ROC curve
also known as Area under the curve (AUC). An AUC of 1.0 indicates a perfect test
with 0 false positives for any value of threshold. An AUC of 0.5 indicates linear
increase of false positives with respect to true positives and indicates bad performance
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of the classifer. AUC has been calculated using trapezoidal rule [3]. Trapezoidal rule
approximates a region of a curve as a trapezoid and helps to calculate definite integral.
We calculate area under the ROC curve by not considering false positive rate
greater than 0.1. The resulting area is called a partial area under the curve and
is normalized by 0.1. Such a measure was used in [2] to evaluate results of their
technique.
5.3 Experiments on Datasets of simulated HTTP traffic
We performed similar experiments on some additional datasets of HTTP traffic
and attack traffic. As specified in chapter 4, all benign traffic was captured from a
wordpress [26] website and attack traffic was generated using metasploit [14].
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CHAPTER 6
Results
In this chapter, we present the results of our proposed techniques. We have used
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC), Area Under Curve (AUC), and standard
error to evaluate performance of the three techniques. For all the results presented
here, the models were trained on benign HTTP traffic from DARPA’99 [8] dataset.
6.1 Generic Attacks Dataset
In this section, we discuss results of our techniques when applied on the Generic
Attacks dataset. Figures 9, 11 and 13 show box plots of scores of benign traffic and
attack traffic obtained by χ2 distance, adhoc n-gram distance and pattern counting re-
spectively. Figures 10, 12 and 14 show ROC curves obtained by plotting true positive
rate and false positive rate for n-gram sizes—1–5 for each of the three techniques.
As cited earlier in chapter 4, attack traffic in this dataset resembles benign HTTP
traffic. Hence the attacks are difficult to detect using statistical techniques.
Tables 5, 6, 7, summarize the results for all three techniques by providing the
values of AUC ,AUCp and standard error. AUCp denotes partial area under the curve
obtained from ROC curves by considering false positive rates up to 0.1. The resulting
area is normalized with 0.1 to obtain partial area under curve.
The AUCp results from Tables 5 and 6 indicate that most of benign HTTP
traffic is easily detected by our techniques using χ2 distance measure and adhoc n
gram distance measure. The adhoc n-gram distance performs much better compared
to χ2 distance for n-gram sizes 4 and 5.
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Figure 9: BOX plot - Generic Attacks - χ2 Distance- 3 grams
Figure 10: ROC - Generic Attacks - χ2 Distance
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Table 5: χ2 distance - Generic Attacks
N gram size AUC AUCp Standard Error
1 0.9965 0.9778 0.00012
2 0.9977 0.9807 0.00008
3 0.9987 0.9897 0.00005
4 0.9958 0.9609 0.00014
5 0.9930 0.9346 0.00020
Figure 11: BOX plot - Generic Attacks- Adhoc n-gram Distance - 3 grams
Table 7 shows results for pattern counting approach. Results are very impressive
for n-gram sizes 4 and 5 considering how simple and efficient the technique is. Results
show that count of different 4 grams and 5 grams in a packet is enough to separate
benign traffic and attack traffic.
Results are poor for n-gram sizes 1 and 2. But this is expected as all 1 grams
and 2 grams of bytes from attack traffic packets are likely to be present in benign
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Figure 12: ROC - Generic Attacks - Adhoc n-gram distance
Table 6: Adhoc n-gram distance - Generic Attacks
N gram size AUC AUCp Standard Error
1 0.9984 0.9887 0.000059
2 0.9985 0.9907 0.000057
3 0.9981 0.9903 0.000070
4 0.9980 0.9903 0.000072
5 0.9975 0.9899 0.000086
traffic as well.
Figure 15 shows the plot of AUCp values for n-gram sizes 1–5 for all 3 techniques
of our paper. Figure 16 shows a corresponding trend of AUCp values from the pa-
per [2]. Results indicate that our techniques perform much better for smaller n-gram
sizes compared to the technique in [2]. Even a simple approach like pattern counting
gives very good results.
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Figure 13: BOX plot - Generic Attacks- Pattern Counting - 4 grams
Figure 14: ROC - Generic Attacks - Pattern Counting
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Table 7: Pattern Counting - Generic Attacks
N gram size AUC AUCp Standard Error
1 0.2760 0.0000 0.01000
2 0.7123 0.0002 0.00660
3 0.9822 0.8258 0.00055
4 0.9982 0.9843 0.00006
5 0.9993 0.9953 0.00002
According to paper [2], an n-gram-approach in [25] is outperformed by their
HMM based technique. Our results indicate that n-gram techniques used in our
paper give better results than than the HMM based technique in [2].
Figure 15: Generic Attacks - AUCp values for n-gram sizes 1–5
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Figure 16: HMMPayl - Generic Attacks - AUCp values for n-gram sizes 2–10
6.2 Shellcode Attacks Dataset
The shellcode attacks dataset contains attacks which inject executable code into
the target machine. The attack traffic in this dataset contains many byte sequences
which are not present in benign HTTP traffic. Most of the benign HTTP traffic used
to train the model contains only ASCII characters in case of DARPA’99 [8] dataset.
Attacks in this dataset are easier to detect compared to those in the Generic attacks
dataset. Figures 17, 18, 19 show ROC curves obtained from all three techniques for
n-gram sizes 1–5.
The results obtained from χ2 distance are given in Table 8. The AUCp values
indicate that we obtain very good detection rate for all n gram sizes. The average
AUCp for n-gram sizes 1–5 is 0.99334 and standard deviation is 0.00383. An n-gram
size of 1 byte is sufficient to detect most of benign HTTP traffic.
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Figure 17: ROC - Shellcode Attacks - χ2 distance
Table 8: χ2 distance - Shellcode Attacks
N gram size AUC AUCp Standard Error
1 0.9995 0.9985 0.00002
2 0.9979 0.9928 0.00010
3 0.9978 0.9928 0.00010
4 0.9985 0.9947 0.00007
5 0.9978 0.9879 0.00010
Results for adhoc n-gram distance are shown in Table 9. The average AUCp
for n-gram sizes 1–5 is 0.99288 and standard deviation is 0.00008. These results are
similar to those obtained by the χ2 distance . Most of benign HTTP traffic is detected
by small n-gram sizes.
Table 10 shows results obtained by applying the pattern counting. For this
technique, 4 grams and 5 grams give very good results.
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Figure 18: ROC - Shellcode Attacks - Adhoc n-gram distance
Table 9: Adhoc n-gram distance - Shellcode Attacks
N gram size AUC AUCp Standard Error
1 0.9979 0.9928 0.00010
2 0.9979 0.9928 0.00010
3 0.9978 0.9929 0.00010
4 0.9979 0.9930 0.00010
5 0.9979 0.9929 0.00010
Table 11 summarizes the results specified in paper [2] for this dataset. They
conducted experiments using n-gram sizes 2–10. The average AUCp values are shown
for all rules used to combine scores computed by multiple HMMs. They also obtain
very good results for this dataset. As mentioned earlier, most of benign HTTP traffic
consists of only text data. Presence of executable byte sequences in attack traffic can
be easily detected by any simple statistical technique.
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Figure 19: ROC - Shellcode Attacks - Pattern Counting
Table 10: Pattern Counting - Shellcode Attacks
N gram size AUC AUCp Standard Error
1 0.5634 0.0000 0.01268
2 0.9423 0.4423 0.00250
3 0.9660 0.6749 0.00150
4 0.9980 0.9928 0.00010
5 0.9982 0.9953 0.00009
Table 11: Results from HMMPayl - Shellcode Attacks
HMM combining Rule Average AUCp
Minimum 0.99909
Maximum 0.91937
Mean 0.97187
Geometric Mean 0.99967
39
An n-gram approach like ours is better for such a scenario compared to costly
intrusion detection technique proposed in [2].
6.3 CLET Dataset
The CLET dataset contains polymorphic versions of malware from shellcode
attacks dataset.
Figures 20 and 21 show ROC curves for χ2 distance and adhoc n-gram distance.
Table 12 summarizes results for χ2 distance. The average AUCp value for n-gram sizes
1–5 is 0.97266 and standard deviation is 0.03204. Table 13 shows results obtained
from adhoc n-gram distance. The average AUCp value for n-gram sizes 1–5 is 0.98812
and standard deviation is 0.01063.
AUCp values indicate that both distance based techniques detect most of benign
traffic easily. The adhoc n-gram distance outperforms χ2 distance for n-gram sizes 4
and 5.
Table 12: χ2 distance - CLET Dataset
N gram size AUC AUCp Standard Error
1 0.9982 0.9839 0.00004
2 0.9997 0.9976 0.00001
3 0.9997 0.9974 0.00001
4 0.9964 0.9633 0.00007
5 0.9922 0.9211 0.00014
Figure 22 shows ROC curves obtained from pattern counting for n- gram sizes
1–5. Table 14 shows the results for pattern counting when applied on this dataset.
For n-gram sizes 3, 4, 5 all attacks are detected with 0 false positive rate.
Results from paper [2] are shown in Table 15. They conducted experiments using
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Figure 20: ROC - CLET Dataset - χ2 distance
Figure 21: ROC - CLET Dataset - Adhoc n-gram distance
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Table 13: Adhoc n gram distance - CLET Dataset
N gram size AUC AUCp Standard Error
1 0.9968 0.9691 0.00007
2 0.9994 0.9928 0.00002
3 0.9991 0.9928 0.00002
4 0.9994 0.9930 0.00002
5 0.9990 0.9929 0.00003
Figure 22: ROC - CLET Dataset - Pattern Counting
n-gram sizes 2–10. The average AUCp values are shown for all rules used to combine
scores computed by multiple HMMs.
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Table 14: Pattern Counting - CLET Dataset
N gram size AUC AUCp Standard Error
1 0.9721 0.7221 0.00045
2 0.9418 0.7133 0.00002
3 1 1 0
4 1 1 0
5 1 1 0
Table 15: Results from HMMPayl - CLET Dataset
HMM combining Rule Average AUCp
Minimum 0.9984
Maximum 0.9355
Mean 0.97553
Geometric Mean 0.99935
6.4 Performance analysis
In this section, we discuss the performance of the three techniques in terms of
packet processing time. Figure 23 shows the plot of per packet processing time against
n-gram sizes for all three techniques considered in this paper. For χ2 distance and
adhoc n-gram distance, there is sharp increase in processing time for n-gram sizes
greater than 3. Table 16 summarizes per packet processing time for each technique
and n gram sizes 1–5.
Table 16: Summary of performance data (Time in milliseconds)
n-gram size
Technique 1 2 3 4 5
χ2 distance 0.11068 0.65992 14.9650 18.0545 37.8059
Adhoc n-gram distance 0.11730 0.65510 6.5731 18.1456 39.2168
Pattern counting 0.03300 0.05660 0.0632 0.0664 0.0807
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Figure 23: Performance - per packet processing time (milliseconds)
The performance of the pattern counting is the best. This is expected as the tech-
nique does not involve any processing at all. We have implemented pattern counting
using hash tables. Table 17 shows number of unique n-grams from traffic of day
one of DARPA’99 [8] dataset. The number of unique n-grams increases with n-gram
size. But the increase is not large enough to cause collisions in our implementation of
hash table. Hence, there is only a slight increase in processing time per packet with
increase in n-gram size.
Table 18 shows the per packet processing time for the HMM-based technique
in [2]. In some experiments,they randomly select a subset of n-grams from a packet
and use them to calculate the probability score for the packet. This is done to improve
performance at the cost of accuracy of detection. Sampling ratio is the percentage of
n-grams selected from a packet.
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Table 17: Number of unique n grams
N gram size Count
1 90
2 3735
3 23756
4 58234
5 87495
Table 18: Summary of performance data - HMMPayl (Time in milliseconds)
Sampling Ratio Time (ms)
20% 7.48
40% 12.71
60% 17.70
80% 22.96
100% 27.51
Results show that our techniques are faster for smaller n-gram sizes for χ2 and
adhoc n-gram distance. For our experiments, we consider all n-grams of an incoming
packet to compute its similarity to benign traffic model.
We haven’t provided any quantitative comparison between both approaches in
terms of memory requirements. But the approach in [2] would require a lot more
memory to maintain multiple HMMs with large number of states, compared to our
approach which just requires frequency counts of n-gram byte sequences.
Details about the system used for our testing purposes are given in Table 19.
Table 19: System Configuration
CPU Memory Operating System
Intel Core i-5 2520M 4 GB Microsoft Windows 7.0
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6.5 Results for experiments on dataset of simulated HTTP traffic
In this section, we present results from experiments on datasets of simulated
benign HTTP traffic and attack traffic. As mentioned in chapter 4, benign HTTP
traffic was captured from a wordpress website we had set up.
We used 4 attack datasets—Php based attack dataset, Twiki based at-
tack dataset, Microsoft IIS Buffer Overflow Attacks dataset and Generic attacks
dataset. The Generic attacks dataset is same as the one used in experiments with
DARPA’99 [8] dataset. More details about these datasets are given in chapter 4.
6.5.1 Experimental Setup
A five fold cross validation [11] was implemented on the dataset of benign HTTP
traffic where 80% of traffic was used for training purposes and remaining 20% was
used for testing purposes. The experiment was repeated five times. Each fold of test
data was compared against an attack dataset.
6.5.2 Results
In this section, we summarize results by providing ROC curves and values of
AUC.
6.5.2.1 Generic Attacks Dataset
Figure 24 shows ROC curves derived by using the χ2 distance. The corresponding
AUC values are shown in Table 20. The detection system is able to detect all attacks
with no false positives for n-gram sizes 3,4 and 5.
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Figure 24: ROC - Generic Attacks - χ2 Distance
Table 20: χ2 distance - Generic Attacks
N gram size AUC AUCp Standard Error
1 0.9976 0.9825 0.00017
2 0.9999 0.9997 0.00001
3 1 1 0
4 1 1 0
5 1 1 0
Figure 25 shows ROC curves derived using adhoc n-gram distance. The AUC
values in Table 21 indicate that the adhoc n-gram distance does not perform better
that the χ2 distance based approach.
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Figure 25: ROC - Generic Attacks - Adhoc n-gram Distance
Table 21: Adhoc n-gram distance - Generic Attacks
N gram size AUC AUCp Standard Error
1 0.9981 0.9863 0.00016
2 0.9989 0.9933 0.00011
3 0.9989 0.9934 0.00011
4 0.9990 0.9942 0.00011
5 0.9991 0.9949 0.00010
Figure 26 shows ROC curves for pattern counting for n-gram sizes 1–5. The
corresponding AUC values are given in Table 22. We obtain very good results for
n-gram sizes 3,4 and 5.
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Figure 26: ROC - Generic Attacks - Pattern Counting
Table 22: Pattern Counting - Generic Attacks
N gram size AUC AUCp Standard Error
1 0.4634 0 0.00930
2 0.9756 0.7564 0.00091
3 1 1 0
4 1 1 0
5 1 1 0
6.5.2.2 Php based Attacks Dataset
Attacks in this dataset are based on Php related vulnerabilities and are most
relevant to the benign traffic used to train the model. Figure 27 shows ROC curves
obtained by χ2 distance for this dataset. Table 23 shows the values of AUC for
different n-gram sizes. All attacks are detected with zero false positives for n-gram
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sizes 2 or more using χ2 distance.
Figure 27: ROC - Php based Attacks - χ2 Distance
Table 23: χ2 distance - Php based Attacks
N gram size AUC AUCp Standard Error
1 0.9998 0.9986 0.00004
2 1 1 0
3 1 1 0
4 1 1 0
5 1 1 0
Table 24 summarizes results obtained from adhoc n-gram distance derived from
ROC curves in Figure 28. Results are equally good when compared to those obtained
by χ2 distance.
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Figure 28: ROC - Php based Attacks - Adhoc n-gram Distance
Table 24: Adhoc n-gram distance - Php based Attacks
N gram size AUC AUCp Standard Error
1 0.9996 0.9944 0.00006
2 1 1 0
3 1 1 0
4 1 1 0
5 1 1 0
Pattern counting also works well on this dataset of attacks as evident from Ta-
ble 25. The ROC curves corresponding to these results, are shown in Figure 29.
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Figure 29: ROC - Php based Attacks - Pattern Counting
Table 25: Pattern Counting - Php based Attacks
N gram size AUC AUCp Standard Error
1 0.9872 0.8728 0.00043
2 1 1 0
3 1 1 0
4 1 1 0
5 1 1 0
6.5.2.3 Microsoft IIS buffer overflow Attacks Dataset
This dataset contains shellcode attacks which attempt to exploit buffer over-
flow vulnerabilities on Microsoft IIS servers. Attacks in this dataset are a lot easier
to detect when compared to benign traffic. This is evident from ROC curves in
Figures 30, 31 and 32. The corresponding values of AUC and AUCp are given in Ta-
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bles 26, 27 and 28. We obtain perfect detection for all n-gram sizes for all techniques.
Figure 30: ROC - MS Buffer overflow Attacks - χ2 Distance
Table 26: χ2 distance - MS Buffer overflow Attacks
N gram size AUC AUCp Standard Error
1 1 1 0
2 1 1 0
3 1 1 0
4 1 1 0
5 1 1 0
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Figure 31: ROC - MS Buffer overflow Attacks - Adhoc n-gram Distance
Table 27: Adhoc n-gram distance - MS Buffer overflow Attacks
N gram size AUC AUCp Standard Error
1 1 1 0
2 1 1 0
3 1 1 0
4 1 1 0
5 1 1 0
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Figure 32: ROC - MS Buffer overflow Attacks - Pattern Counting
Table 28: Pattern Counting - MS Buffer overflow Attacks
N gram size AUC AUCp Standard Error
1 1 1 0
2 1 1 0
3 1 1 0
4 1 1 0
5 1 1 0
6.5.2.4 Twiki based Attack Datasets
Results for this dataset are similar to those obtained from Microsoft Shellcode
attacks dataset. The detection system is able to separate benign traffic from attack
traffic for all n-gram sizes for all techniques. The ROC curves are given in Fig-
ures 33, 34 and 35. Tables 29, 30 and 31 summarize results by providing values of
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AUC, AUCp for n-gram sizes 1–5.
Figure 33: ROC - Twiki based attacks - χ2 Distance
Table 29: χ2 distance - Twiki based Attacks
N gram size AUC AUCp Standard Error
1 1 1 0
2 1 1 0
3 1 1 0
4 1 1 0
5 1 1 0
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Figure 34: ROC - Twiki based attacks - Adhoc n-gram Distance
Table 30: Adhoc n-gram distance - Twiki based Attacks
N gram size AUC AUCp Standard Error
1 1 1 0
2 1 1 0
3 1 1 0
4 1 1 0
5 1 1 0
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Figure 35: ROC - Twiki based attacks - Pattern Counting
Table 31: Pattern Counting - Twiki based Attacks
N gram size AUC AUCp Standard Error
1 1 1 0
2 1 1 0
3 1 1 0
4 1 1 0
5 1 1 0
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion and Future work
In this project, we implemented three n-gram based techniques to detect attacks
in HTTP traffic. Our techniques are based on analysis of byte distributions in HTTP
packets. The techniques were extensively tested on standard public datasets of HTTP
traffic and attack traffic. Results indicate that our approaches can detect 99% of
innocent HTTP traffic from attack traffic in case of DARPA’99 dataset [8].
We also compare our results with those found in [2] in terms of accuracy of attack
detection and performance. Results clearly indicate that our techniques perform much
better than their HMM-based approach for smaller n-gram sizes. Our techniques are
also much simpler and efficient in terms of processing time and memory requirements.
Our method relies on a single model of benign HTTP traffic and compares all
incoming traffic with this model. It might be useful to create multiple content specific
models of HTTP traffic. All incoming packets can be compared with each model
before classifying them as benign or malicious.
Our approach classifies each individual packet as benign or malicious. Incoming
packets which belong to the same TCP stream can be re-assembled into a single
stream of bytes. This stream of bytes can then be classified as benign or malicious.
Such an approach can give more accurate detection.
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